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ABSTRACT: This article examines the strategic logic of siege
warfare in counterinsurgencies and questions the perception
that siege warfare as an effective and relatively low-cost form of
counterinsurgency. Sieges do allow the besieging side to conserve its
military resources, avoid direct contact with the enemy, and minimize
a rapid escalation of civilian casualties. Yet, on a strategic level, siege
warfare is ineffective without major outside military support or the
willingness to use overwhelming force.

S

ieges, among the oldest and most recognized forms of warfare, are
often poorly understood by military planners and policymakers
alike. Siege warfare is almost completely absent from current
US military doctrine. From the Joint perspective, the term “siege” does
not appear in, and is not defined in, either the Joint capstone document
discussing Joint operations, the Joint doctrinal publication providing the
fundamental principles of Joint operations, or the Department of Defense
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.1 Similarly, siege is not included
or defined in the US Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 1-02 Terms
and Military Symbols. Nor does the term appear in the Army doctrinal
publication discussing Army operations or the specific doctrine covering
offensive and defensive operations.2 There is some discussion of siege
warfare in the US Army Field Manual 3-06 Urban Operations; however, the
majority of that discussion is in an appendix focusing on a single case
study regarding the siege of Beirut in 1982.3
Interestingly, that discussion indicates a list of factors deemed
central to the success of siege warfare that include understanding the
importance of information and psychological operations, preserving close
combat capability, avoiding the attrition approach, minimizing collateral
damage, controlling essential services and critical infrastructure,
separating noncombatants from combatants, and transitioning control
to civil authorities as quickly as possible.4 Even so, these lessons have
The authors would like to thank Jillian Kutner for her research assistance as well as Alexander
Downes, Liam Collins, John Spencer, Devlin Winkelstein, and the International Studies Association
2017 participants and panelists who provided helpful feedback incorporated in this article.
1      US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication
(JP) 1 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2013); JCS, Joint Operations, JP 3-0 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2011); and
JCS, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: JCS, March
2017).
2      Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDOA), Terms and Military Symbols, Army
Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 1-02 (Washington, DC: HQDOA, 2016); HQDOA, Unified
Land Operations, ADRP 3-0 (Washington, DC: HQDOA, 2012); and HQDOA, Offense and Defense,
ADRP 3-90 (Washington, DC: HQDOA, 2012).
3      HQDOA, Urban Operations, Field Manual (FM) 3-06 (Washington, DC: HQDOA, 2006),
A1–A7.
4      Ibid., A4–A7.
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not been well integrated into the doctrinal frameworks of offensive or
defensive urban operations. In fact, sieges are not included as a form of
offensive maneuver or a type of urban offensive operations.5 Similarly,
little academic research theorizes about the tactical and the strategic
advantages of siege warfare as a tool of counterinsurgency. Moreover,
most of the existing literature on siege warfare hails from strategic
studies or military historiography and focuses primarily on the use of
sieges in the context of conventional interstate wars.6
This article fills that gap by addressing the logic, motivations,
and some of the internal contradictions of siege warfare in modern
counterinsurgencies. The authors predict siege warfare will become
even more relevant in the future if urban migration patterns persist
since counterinsurgencies will be carried out increasingly in dense
urban environments or megacities, not in the jungles of Southeast Asia
or the empty deserts of Mesopotamia.7 Still, few academic studies have
looked at sieges in the context of modern counterinsurgencies, which are
increasingly asymmetrical, urban, and fought with methods—including
the use of chemical weapons or the deliberate targeting of civilians—
that are blunt violations of international humanitarian law.

Siege Warfare and Counterinsurgencies

A siege is any attempt by an adversary to control access into and out
of a town, neighborhood, or other terrain of strategic significance to
achieve a military or political objective. The military objective of a siege
during the Middle Ages was to drive out enemy forces by weakening
their defenses and denying them access to reinforcements. In effect,
sieges provided a way to subdue an enemy while limiting direct hostilities
and reducing one’s own casualties. Whereas strong fortifications during
medieval times favored the defense, more infantry weapons from cheaper
iron in modern warfare favored the offense.8 But in the contemporary
era, given the greater density of urban terrain, siege warfare is arguably
more challenging for the offense. Even with the assistance of Russian
arms and aircraft, for example, the stronger Syrian military was unable
to dislodge the modest Syrian rebel forces from entrenched positions in
Aleppo for most of 2016.
The typical modus operandi of siege warfare dating back to Roman
times has been one of conquest. In counterinsurgency, however,
the military objective is often not conquest but control of territory.
Counterinsurgency is largely seen as either enemy-centric—focused
on defeating the foe militarily—or population-centric—focusing on
separating the insurgents from the civilian population.9 In the latter case,
the use of force does not typically revolve around a large concentration
5      Ibid., 7–12.
6      See Harrison E. Salisbury, The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad (New York: Harper & Row,
1969); P. F. Purton, A History of the Early Medieval Siege, c. 450–1220 (Woodbridge, NY: Boydell &
Brewer, 2009); and J. Bowyer Bell, Besieged: Seven Cities under Siege (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction,
2006).
7      On these urbanization trends, see David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the
Urban Guerrilla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
8      Stephen Van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War,” International Security 22, no. 4
(Spring 1998): 5–43. doi:10.1162/isec.22.4.5.
9      Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir, “What After Counter-Insurgency? Raiding in Zones of
Turmoil,” International Affairs 92 no. 6 (November 2016): 1427–41. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12751.
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of firepower per se, but rather lighter foot patrols and targeted attacks
that deny the enemy their center of gravity: the population.10 This type
of counterinsurgency has been framed as a fight between the state and
the insurgency over the allegiance of the population.
Accordingly, counterinsurgency does not require killing as many of
the enemy as possible or retaking all the contested territory, but rather
winning the population over to the state’s or counterinsurgent’s side. Put
otherwise, winning battles is less important than effective governance
that pacifies the population and provides public goods. A core tenet
of US counterinsurgency doctrine practiced over the past decade has
indeed been to selectively target hostile parties and forcibly separate them
from the local civilian population.11 Under this logic, insurgencies are
seen as armed competitions for locals’ allegiance. Greater control over
territory provides counterinsurgents with greater information about the
enemy, which allows the counterinsurgent forces to avoid indiscriminate
violence and deny the insurgents a base of popular support.12
The origins of this strategy date back to the British counterinsurgency
in Malaya (1948–60) as well as the Strategic Hamlet Program from the
Vietnam War (1954–75).13 Then, as now, the philosophy was to isolate
entire villages—to separate insurgents forcibly from civilians. Even
for counterinsurgencies employing a more punishment-driven strategy
heavy on firepower, the aim is not to eliminate the population per se
but rather to control and to prevent it from supporting the insurgency.
The military objective of enemy-centric and population-centric
counterinsurgencies overlaps with that of modern siege warfare, which
is to isolate the population by force. Also like siege warfare, populationcentric counterinsurgencies require patience. Data collected from 1900
show the average siege lasts longer than 12 months.14 In Aleppo, for
example, the campaign of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime
to besiege the eastern side of the city lasted for over three years, with
little movement in the lines of control, before the Russian intervention
in September 2015 facilitated the full encirclement of the rebel-held
pockets there, speeding up the eventual capitulation.
A key difference between population-centric counterinsurgency and
siege warfare, however, is the geography of force: in the former, security
and the insurgency’s clearing and holding areas begin at the center of a
city, before slowly moving outwardly, much like a spreading oil spot.15 By
contrast, siege warfare generally takes an outside-in approach whereby
10      Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006).
11      Sir Robert Grainger Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and
Vietnam (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1966).
12      Kalyvas, Logic of Violence. This logic provides the intellectual backbone of the “clear, hold,
and build” model applied in Iraq after 2006, as US soldiers moved out of forward operating bases
(FOBs) and engaged in smaller-scale military patrols to liberate and expand security in areas previously held by insurgents.
13      For more on the intellectual origins of US counterinsurgency, see Conrad C. Crane, Cassandra
in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016).
14      Data varies but counterinsurgencies typically last over nine years. Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency
in Afghanistan, RAND Counterinsurgency Study Volume 4 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,
2008).
15      Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr, “How to Win in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (September/
October 2005): 87–104.
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counterinsurgents seize territory along a city’s outskirts and slowly
enclose the enemy.
Not unlike counterinsurgencies at large, siege warfare introduces a
number of perverse incentives among combatants and noncombatants
alike.16 First, siege warfare may be advantageous for the besieged side as
it allows it time to regroup and rearm, to hold key terrain under stalemate
conditions, and to signal strength to outside powerbrokers capable of
pushing for a ceasefire. Paradoxically, a siege can lead to strengthening
the level of dependency and control a rebel group has on the civilian
population. Moreover, a siege can perversely generate economic benefits
for the besieged group by creating self-sustaining “siege economies”
created by actions such as aid manipulation and smuggling.17 Siege
warfare thus holds some strategic logic for both besieged and besieger.
Siege warfare, while tactically attractive to counterinsurgents,
is strategically ineffective unless two conditions are met: first, the
counterinsurgency must be willing to use overwhelming force, which
includes indiscriminate violence or scorched earth tactics. Second, there
must be a forceful military intervention on behalf of the besieger by an
outside power.18 Otherwise, the siege effectively becomes a protracted
war of attrition that favors the side with sufficient will and resources
to outlast the other. Considering the dense terrain of today’s cities and
the unwillingness of democracies to sustain heavy losses, siege warfare
to gain territory is only advantageous to the besieger who enjoys the
support of outside backers or who is willing to use overwhelming force.19
Thus, siege warfare, whether to protect the population from harm or to
prevent it from joining the fight, should only be used to isolate a territory
similar to Sadr City, a Shiite slum in Baghdad (2004–2008).20

The Strategic Logic of Siege Warfare

Western military strategists debate counterinsurgency tactics and
strategies that focus on winning over the population’s loyalty. Primarily
nondemocratic states have sought the opposite objective—to starve
an enemy populace into capitulation—thus robbing the insurgency’s
base of popular support. This approach is driven by a common set of
assumptions. First, laying siege to an area appears a cost-effective way
to be perceived as staying on the offensive, conserving resources for
battles elsewhere, and avoiding a large-scale atrocity that might provoke
an outside intervention on behalf of the besieged.21 Sieges allow armies
to keep the enemy geographically contained in urban areas and to
prevent their resupply while minimizing the besieger’s own casualties by
avoiding direct combat. These benefits can be especially important when
16      See Stathis N. Kalyvas and Matthew Adam Kocher, “How ‘Free’ Is Free Riding in Civil
Wars?: Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem,” World Politics 59, no. 2 (January
2007): 177–216.
17      Peter Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).
18      Alexander B. Downes, Targeting Civilians in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).
19      For a challenge to this logic based on the argument that democracies may be more willing to
engage in indiscriminant violence because it is perceived as winning the war more quickly given the
costs democratic leaders face if they do not win a war, see Downes, Targeting Civilians.
20      “The April 2004 Battle of Sadr City,” US Army Center of Military History, April 21, 2014,
http://www.history.army.mil/news/2014/140421a_sadrCity.html.
21      Downes, Targeting Civilians, 158–59.
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a great parity of military power exists between the opposing sides and
the advancing army does not possess the human, financial, or military
resources to seize and control the city outright.
Second, siege warfare seems an attractive option for both types
of counterinsurgencies when civil wars drag on for years, becoming
a stalemate; thus, the counterinsurgency becomes a war of attrition,
redolent of World War I trench warfare. In Syria, for example, dozens
of cities suffered prolonged and repeated sieges between 2012 and 2016.
Infamous examples include the brutal siege of Madaya, a town in the
rural Damascus governorate, where a Syrian and Hezbollah-backed
siege culminated in the complete lock-down of the city in June 2015
and led to a severe humanitarian crisis.22 With military checkpoints and
antipersonnel landmines preventing the delivery of goods into, and
civilians’ departure from, the besieged area, Syrians in Madaya were
literally starved to death.23 A similar account emerged in the Palestinian
refugee camp of Yarmouk that former UN Secretary-General Ban
Ki-Moon described as the “deepest circle of hell.”24
Moreover, sieges can displace the populations of key embattled areas.
This depopulation deprives the insurgency of human resources and
demoralizes the rebellion, while it renews manpower and international
assistance for the government. It can also strengthen a regime’s claim
to legitimacy by allowing it to rule over the majority of the population.
To be sure, technology has also changed the intensity, lethality,
and length of siege warfare. Besieging forces now rely more on heavy
and indiscriminate bombardment by air and artillery as a form of
psychological warfare and as a method of increasing the risk and cost
of rebel and civilian refusals to surrender. These mechanisms also blunt
the tools counterinsurgents have at their disposal, especially when there
is poor intelligence on the enemy.25
But this can be counterproductive—for instance, indiscriminate
targeting of civilians, despite international rules barring such uses of
force, remains widespread but arguably, counterproductive, especially
in non-expeditionary counterinsurgencies. In the siege of Grozny,
“indiscriminate bombing and shelling turned the local population
against the Russians” largely because the Russians were attacking their
own people who were living in the center of the city.26
Other exogenous conditions of modern warfare that should favor the
defense exist. First, the increasing density of urban areas, subterranean
infrastructure, and suburban sprawl, along with the role of networked
populations, can increase connections between the insurgency and the
population, allow undetected mobilization of insurgent forces, and
provide a buffer zone advancing armies must penetrate to advance.
22      Editorial Board, “The Siege of Madaya Casts a Shadow on Syrian Peace Efforts,” Washington
Post, January 9, 2016; and Human Rights Council (HRC), Report of the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/33/55 (New York: United Nations, 2016).
23      “Syria: Siege and Starvation in Madaya,” Medecins Sans Frontieres, January 7, 2016,
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/syria-siege-and-starvation-madaya.
24      AFP, “U.N. Chief: Yarmouk Camp Now ‘Deepest Circle of Hell’ in Syria,” Al Arabiya
English, April 10, 2015.
25      Kalyvas and Kocher, “How ‘Free’?”
26      Timothy L. Thomas, “The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat,”
Parameters 29, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 87–102.
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Second, the glacial pace of sieges can effectively freeze a conflict, since
lines of control rarely budge much during the operational phase: a
siege is mostly an all-or-nothing campaign of attrition, not one to gain
ground or shift momentum. This dynamic can allow insurgents time to
regroup, mobilize the population, and boost morale even though food
and ammunition may be in short supply. Civilians in cities can weather
severe hardships almost indefinitely.
Third, a siege can foster the development of dysfunctional, yet
self-sustaining, siege economies. In Sarajevo, a small core of Bosnian
soldiers relied heavily on ordinary citizens who took up arms to protect
the city. These ad hoc groups of citizen-soldiers organized around
existing social structures with little or no immediate access to military
materials or resources. They relied heavily on supply routes the Bosnian
Serbs purposefully left open.27 The most notable was a tunnel system
connecting Sarajevo to Bosnian-controlled territory beyond the city’s
limits. This underground network became the Bosnian army’s main
way of transporting food, humanitarian supplies, and weapons into the
city and prevented Sarajevo from deteriorating to the point of complete
chaos and worsening the humanitarian crisis.28
Finally, a siege can signal resolve, determination, and commitment
to an insurgency’s goals at a fairly low cost to both outside parties and
potential recruits. This advantage can also provide perverse incentives
for the modern insurgent who may, even at the risk of great civilian
suffering, favor hunkering down to fighting their enemy, retreating, or
melting into the countryside to fight a Maoist-style guerrilla war.
In sum, despite its growing popularity as a counterinsurgency
strategy, siege warfare rarely is effective to defeat an enemy, seize or
control important terrain, or change the balance of power to end a war—
barring a major outside intervention or a willingness on the part of the
counterinsurgent to nearly level the area under siege. To better illustrate
this point, two short case studies of the sieges of Aleppo and Grozny
counterintuitively reveal some of the tactical and strategic limitations
of siege warfare, short of relying on overwhelming indiscriminate force
and external backing.

Case Study: Aleppo (2013–2016)

Beginning in 2013, the Syrian regime of President al-Assad attempted
to lay siege to eastern Aleppo, a small enclave that gradually became
choked from all sides by government-controlled forces. With about
25,000 troops initially, the regime lacked the material strength to occupy
the area and struggled to take and to hold territory, especially in this
dense urban terrain, without sustaining high casualties and carrying out
an extensive house-to-house counterinsurgency campaign. So, instead
of attempting a ground assault to retake eastern Aleppo, the regime
began a series of offensive maneuvers aimed at encircling the rebel-held
pockets of the city, cutting off their supply lines, and restricting their

27      Michael Jackson, Samuel Ruppert, and David Stanford, Contemporary Battlefield Assessment—
Bosnia and Herzegovina (West Point, NY: Modern War Institute, 2015).
28      Andreas, Blue Helmets.
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access to basic services such as electricity and water.29 At the same time,
through systematic airstrikes and artillery shelling, the regime focused
on targeting civilians and combatants alike, traumatizing Aleppo’s
civilians into a mass exodus. Meanwhile, through fortified positions and
airpower, the regime strengthened its own positions in the city, creating
a static frontline.30 By encircling eastern Aleppo, Assad’s forces gained
control of the surrounding governorate with aerial bombardments,
laying the foundation for the movement of ground forces composed
of Syrian army and militias.31 While destroying civilian infrastructure,
these operations also complicated the work of international and local
humanitarian actors on the ground.
But, the push to encircle and besiege eastern Aleppo also revealed
the Syrian military’s weaknesses. Siege operations alone were unable to
force capitulation even though the enemy’s advance was halted and an
incredibly high price tag was imposed on the rebels and the civilians living
under their control. Despite the high reliance on foreign and domestic
militias, the encirclement operations preceded slowly and suffered from
repeated setbacks, revealing just how overextended the regime and its
allies were. Yet, while not decisive, the encircling maneuvers contained
the opposition and forced a painful stalemate, all while conserving
force and avoiding the high cost of storming and holding the rebel
neighborhoods. Moreover, the siege, combined with sustained aerial
attacks, forcefully displaced the population, which effectively reduced
the number of people under rebel control.
The Russian military intervention in Aleppo during September
2015 as well as its active and increased air support for the Syrian Army
and its allies—especially after December 2015—was, in this context,
highly valuable to the regime, allowing the balance of power in the battle
to shift. Rebels accused the Russians of carrying out a “scorched earth”
policy of counterinsurgency redolent of the siege of Grozny.32
For the regime, Russia’s intervention was a game changer facilitating
a key breakthrough. In February 2016, the regime and its allied forces
cut off the rebels’ northern supply lines to the Turkish border, known
as the Azaz corridor, further restricting goods and people to and
from rebel-controlled pockets in Eastern Aleppo.33 The complete
encirclement, in the summer of 2016, cut off the last rebel supply line,
Castello Road, trapping roughly 300,000 civilians.34 Over the following
months, Russia’s heavy bombing of eastern Aleppo, including its civilian
infrastructure, combined with the tight siege and the withholding of
humanitarian assistance eventually led to the regime’s advance into the
embattled city, the rebels’ capitulation in December 2016, and the forced
displacement of tens of thousands of people.
29      Caerus Associates, Mapping the Conflict in Aleppo, Syria (Fort Lauderdale, FL: Caerus /
American Security Project, 2014).
30      Christopher Kozak, An Army in All Corners: Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria, Middle East
Security Report 26 (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, 2015).
31      HRC, Report.
32      “The Agony of Aleppo,” Economist, October 1, 2016.
33      Fabrice Balanche,”The Battle of Aleppo Is the Center of the Syrian Chessboard,” Policywatch
2254, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 5, 2016, http://www.washingtoninstitute
.org/policy-analysis/view/the-battle-of-aleppo-is-the-center-of-the-syrian-chessboard.
34      HRC, Report.
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Case Study: Grozny (1999–2000)

The five-month-long siege of Grozny by Russian forces during the
early phase of the second Chechen war isolated the city, which was an
indigenous separatist enclave in the North Caucasus region, as a way
of compelling local Chechens to forego their struggle for separation.
The Russians had suffered a humiliating defeat during the first Chechen
war (1994–96), and the force they brought to bear in the final months
of 1999 against 3,000 to 6,000 Chechen rebels reflected the challenges
they faced during the previous ill-fated campaign.35 At the time, foreign
witnesses described Grozny as the most leveled city they had ever seen.36
The plan included an intensive and indiscriminate bombing campaign
with airstrikes and heavy artillery barrages from a nearby ridge to wear
down the Chechen defenses and isolate the city; then Russian ground
troops would initiate a ground offensive with small units. In December
1999, the commanding officer on the ground, General Viktor Kazantsev,
said the city was fully blockaded on all sides.37 The campaign sparked a
great deal of controversy as there were still some 40,000 civilians holed
up in central Grozny without supplies and subjected to the violence and
chaos “despite pledges from senior military figures . . . that there would
be no Russian assault on Grozny while ‘a single civilian’ remained.”38
In the previous siege of Grozny, similar “indiscriminate bombing and
shelling turned the local population against the Russians” largely because
there were Russian civilians living in the center of the city and so the
Russians were attacking their own people.39 Before the second attempt,
the Russians dropped pamphlets over the city that warned civilians of
the imminent force and even encouraging rebels to accept “safe conduct
passes” allowing them to leave the city without punishment.40 Yet, there
were widespread reports of Russian soldiers firing upon refugees who
were leaving the city and invading while civilians were still present.41
The Chechen forces were surprisingly strong and resilient, even in
the face of heavy air strikes, forcing Russian ground forces to engage
the rebels within the city itself. Much of this resilience stemmed from
successful application of previous tactical experience from the first
Chechen war. The rebels were also well armed and, having used the
bombardment period to build up various bunkers within the city, well
fortified.42 These preparations enabled the Chechen rebels to ambush
the initial ground force invasion and destroy an entire Russian convoy.43
The Russian forces quickly learned from their initial underestimation
of the rebel capabilities, increased their bombardments, and leveled huge
35      “Grozny to fall ‘in days’,” BBC News, December 15, 1999.
36      Jeremy Bowen, Doris Meissner, Lina Sergie Attar, and Joshua Landis, interview with Joshua
Johnson, How to Turn Things around In Syria, 1A, WAMU broadcast, January 30, 2017, http://the1a
.org/shows/2017-01-30/how-to-turn-things-around-in-syria.
37      “Russia denies killings during Grozny assault,” BBC News, December 5, 1999.
38      Ian Traynor and Amelia Gentleman, “Russians in Grozny Bloodbath,” Guardian, December
15, 1999.
39      Thomas, “Battle of Grozny.”
40      Michael R. Gordon, “Russians Issue an Ultimatum to Rebel City,” New York Times, December
7, 1999.
41      “Russians Fired on Refugees” BBC News, December 4, 1999.
42      “Russians Ambushed in Grozny” BBC News, December 16, 1999.
43      Traynor and Gentleman, “Russians in Grozny Bloodbath.”
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swatches of the city. The Chechen fighters they encountered resisted,
exploiting the terrain while luring the Russians into interconnected
firing positions. Aslambek Ismailov led the Chechens to fortify the city
with antitank ditches, trenches, and landmines along the perimeter. The
rebels boarded up and booby-trapped buildings pockmarked from the
previous war.
Allegations of Russian war crimes, including the use of chemical
weapons, linger in the decades since the second Chechen war, and
contribute to inconclusive estimates of civilian deaths during the
siege. Ultimately, the combination of complete isolation, air strikes,
and overwhelming and unrestrained force proved too much for the
Chechen rebels, who fled into the mountains in early February 2000.44
Unfortunately for the Chechen forces, the Russians created a false sense
of safety that allowed small groups to escape through a mined escape
route. Some Chechens did survive the minefield, swearing to one day
recapture the city they left to the Russians. While there were smallscale skirmishes with guerrillas in the years that followed, the Russians
firmly controlled the city and actively began reconstruction in 2006.45
Though strategically counterproductive and blatantly disregarding
international humanitarian law, especially regarding nonexpeditionary
counterinsurgencies, the use of scorched-earth tactics during the siege
derived a tactical “victory” for Russia.

Applications to US Military Doctrine

Neither Russia nor Syria possessed an operational doctrine
for siege warfare in the context of carrying out nonexpeditionary
counterinsurgency. Similarly, US military forces are unprepared to fight
in dense urban environments against violent nonstate actors who have
deep networks, possess superior knowledge of local terrain, use civilians
as human shields, and fight indirectly. A recent case illustrates this point:
US-backed Iraqi forces failed to cordon off a strategic corridor west
of Mosul in 2015, which allowed Islamic State militants to escape and
resupply. Although the importance of megacities in modern warfare has
been emphasized, US Army doctrine should also address the critical
aspects of siege tactics to urban warfare as a first step in correcting the
lack of training, organization, and matériel for urban or siege warfare.
Moreover, the current body of knowledge contains surprisingly few
rigorous studies on the conduct of siege warfare in modern urban
environments that are dense, networked, and reliant on informal
economies. As a greater risk of civilian casualties arguably exists on these
battlespaces, identification and mitigation of the specific challenges of
siege warfare should also be undertaken.
The short cases outlined above highlight some of the challenges
with siege warfare in the modern era that justify the Clausewitzian
admonition that the worst policy is to attack a fortified city.46 In Aleppo,
the siege may have lasted indefinitely or failed without the strong external
intervention from Russian airpower as well as Hezbollah, Iranian, and
44      Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2000: The Russian Federation,” Human Rights Watch,
2001, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k1/europe/russian.html.
45      Andrew E. Kramer, “Chechnya’s Capital Rises from the Ashes, Atop Hidden Horrors,” New
York Times, April 30, 2008.
46      Bell, Besieged, 1.
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Iranian-backed forces. The siege of Grozny achieved the Russians’
military objective, but only through overwhelming force that included
immense bloodshed and leveling the city. Some might quibble that these
two cases are not generalizable given the fact they were carried out by
authoritarian regimes who were unconcerned with protecting civilian
lives or using indiscriminate force. But these examples do highlight the
challenges every military force faces when laying siege to a piece of
complex or unfamiliar urban terrain.
The United States, rightly unwilling to conduct scorched-earth
campaigns such as Russia’s and frequently unable to rely on allied support,
faces unique challenges when conducting urban military operations in
the context of counterinsurgencies. Since such types of warfare cannot
always be avoided, the US military should not only include but prioritize
siege warfare as part of its Joint doctrine. Notably, the doctrine should
establish best practices to seal off terrain, provide humanitarian aid,
avoid civilian casualties, and ultimately break a siege to prepare the
military for future urban combat operations in complex terrain.
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